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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Justin Brian Miller appeals from the Judgment - Retained Jurisdiction in which he
was sentenced to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, following his
conviction for aggravated assault.

Mr. Miller contends the district court made

evidentiary errors and because the State will not be able to prove the harmlessness of
the errors beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment should be vacated and the matter
remanded for a new trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Miller by Second Amended Information with the crimes of
domestic battery, aggravated assault, and battery; additionally, the State sought a
deadly weapon enhancement.

(R., pp.190-192.)

The jury acquitted Mr. Miller of

domestic battery; however, it convicted him of aggravated assault and battery.

(R.,

pp.291-292.) The district court imposed upon Mr. Miller a unified sentence of five years,
with two years fixed, following his conviction for aggravated assault and 180 days for
battery. (R., pp.309-311.) The district court gave Mr. Miller an opportunity to participate
in the retained jurisdiction program. (R., pp.309-311.) Mr. Miller filed a timely Notice of
Appeal from the Judgment - Retained Jurisdiction. 1 (R., pp.316-318.)

1

The district court granted Mr. Miller probation for three years after successfully
completing his Rider; therefore, no issue involving his sentence will be raised at this
time. See https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.da?roaDetail=yes&schema=
KOOTENAl&partySequence=79781 &county=Kootenai&displayName=Miller%2C+Justin
Brian (last visited 11/26/2013).
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ISSUES
1)

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed Nadine Steen to offer
hearsay testimony about what she told the 911 operator?

2)

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed Officer Austin Cady to
testify about irrelevant information?

3)

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of Melissa
Miller about whether the family had a tradition of shooting guns on New Year's
Day because the testimony was not relevant?

4)

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed Angie Smith to offer
hearsay testimony about what she told Melissa Miller in the kitchen on the day of
the alleged incident?

5)

Under the doctrine of cumulative error, was Mr. Miller's right to a fair trial denied
as a result of the accumulation of serious errors throughout his trial?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Nadine Steen To Offer
Hearsay Testimony About What She Told The 911 Operator

A.

Introduction
Mr. Miller asserts that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Nadine

Steen to testify about what she told dispatch when she called 911.

In this case, the

State will be unable to demonstrate that the error was harmless, and therefore, a new
trial should be ordered.
8.

Standard Of Review
A court's decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009). An appellate court reviewing a district court's
discretionary decision engages in a three part analysis: First, whether the district court
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; second, whether the court acted within
the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and
third, whether the court reached

is decision through an exercise of reason.

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
Trial error ordinarily will not be addressed on appeal unless a timely objection
was made in the trial court.

State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009).

For

alleged errors for which there was a timely objection, Mr. Miller only has the duty to
prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has the burden of demonstrating
that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
222 (2010).
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C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Nadine Steen To Offer
Hearsay Testimony About What She Told The 911 Operator
Mr. Miller objected to Nadine Steen's testimony about what she told the 911

operator as hearsay.

(Tr., p.228, L.24-p.229, L.14.) The district court overruled the

objection finding the offered testimony not to be hearsay because the witness was
present, under oath, and subject to cross-examination. (Tr., p.229, Ls.3-4, 11-12.) The
district court erred.
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that an out of court statement, offered for
the truth of the matter asserted therein, is generally considered hearsay, and that
hearsay is generally inadmissible. I.RE. 801 (c), 802.
Hearsay, which is made generally inadmissible by Idaho Rule of
Evidence 802, is defined as: "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.RE. 801 (c). The hearsay rule not
only prohibits repetition of the actual out-of-court statement; it also applies
where the witness attempts to convey the substance or purport of the
statement. Therefore, a hearsay objection may not be avoided merely by
having the witness give a summary of the conversation or convey the
purport of the information received rather than relating the details of the
statement. If the purpose of such testimony is to prove the truth of facts
asserted in the out-of-court statement, the proffered testimony is hearsay.
See 2 KENNETH S. BROUN et al., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 249 at
104-105 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter McCORMICK];
State v. Judkins, 242 N.W.2d 266 (Iowa 1976); Commonwealth v. Parks,
273 Pa.Super. 506, 417 A.2d 1163 (1979); Schaffer v. State, 777 S.W.2d
111 (Tex.Cr.App.1989).

State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700,704 (Ct. App. 1994).
At trial, after having Nadine Steen testify that Mr. Miller pointed a gun at her, the
prosecutor inquired whether Nadine Steen had contacted 911 and told them the same.
(Tr., p.228, L.18-p.229, L.14.) The testimony went as follows:
Q.

. .. did you call 911 there on your cell phone?

A. Yes, I did.
4

Q. How long do you think your conversation was with the 911 operator?

I would say approximately five minutes.
Q. Did you tell the 911 operator what had just happened to you?

MR. LOATS: I object, your Honor, as to relevance and hearsay.
THE COURT: I am going to allow it. It is not hearsay. It is marginally
relevant.
A.

Yes, I did.

Q. BY MR. VEHEAREN: Did you indicate to the 911 operator that
Mr. Miller pointed a shotgun at you?
A. Yes.

MR. LOATS: That does call for hearsay, the content of what she said.
THE COURT: Overruled. The witness is present under oath and subject
to cross-examination.
BY MR. VEHEAREN: Go ahead and answer.
A.

Yes, I did.

(Tr., p.228, L.18-p.229, L.14.)
Nadine Steen's statement that she told the 911 operator that Mr. Miller pointed a
gun at her is an out of court statement. There is no purpose for offering the statement
other than for the truth of the matter asserted. By definition the testimony offered was
hearsay and the district court erred in overruling Mr. Miller's hearsay objection.
D.

The Admission Of The Evidence Was Not Harmless Error
The United States Supreme Court has described the harmless error doctrine as

follows:
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the
judgment should stand... But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from
the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it
5

is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The
inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result,
apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether
the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave
doubt, the conviction cannot stand.

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (citation omitted). Harmless error
is defined in Rule 52 of the Idaho Criminal Rules as, "Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." The harmless
error doctrine has been further defined by this Court: "To hold an error as harmless, an
appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction."

State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. ·18,
24 (1967)).
Mr. Miller contends that the error was not harmless.

In the instant case, the

ultimate issue in dispute was whether Mr. Miller pointed a firearm at Nadine Steen. The
State utilized the hearsay testimony to bolster Nadine Steen's credibility.

The State

argued, "You know from the testimony here that she immediately called 911, and she
was very upset, that she told the 911 operator that he pointed that gun at her. Again
another piece of corroboration in this case." (Tr., p.383, Ls.20-23.)
This case was ultimately a credibility determination for the jury to decide if
Nadine Steen was telling the truth. As the judge noted in his sentencing remarks, "I
think the reason you were convicted, having sat through the trial, is the jury believed
Nadine Steen.

They believed you pointed that weapon at her, and they probably

believed you made that threat." (Tr., p.444, Ls.19-22.)
The hearsay statement that she told 911 that Mr. Miller pointed a shotgun at her
bolstered Nadine Steen's credibility. The State offered the out of court statement for the
6

truth of the matter asserted. It was hearsay and the district court erred when it allowed
the testimony to be presented to the jury. Although Mr. Miller has demonstrated that the
error was not harmless, because there was a timely objection, Mr. Miller only has the
duty to prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has the burden of
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Perry, 150 Idaho
at 222. The State cannot show the error was harmless in this case.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Officer Austin Cady To Testify
About Irrelevant Information
A.

Introduction
Mr. Miller asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the

State to present evidence that was not relevant to the charge in the case at hand. The
State was allowed to present the testimony of Officer Cady that he parked away from
the residence because a threat of gun was being used to force people out of the house.
Further, assuming arguendo that this Court finds the evidence to be relevant, Mr. Miller
asserts the evidence is overly prejudicial. Therefore, Mr. Miller asserts a new trial
should be ordered.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of

discretion. Grist, 147 Idaho at 51. This Court must examine whether: (1) the trial court
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the outer
bounds of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial
court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Id. However, determinations
of relevancy are reviewed de nova.

State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 218 (Ct. App.

2009).
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C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Certain Testimony Of
Officer Cady Because The Testimony Was Not Relevant
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
I.R.

401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible; conversely, irrelevant evidence

is inadmissible. I.R.E. 402. Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law that is
freely reviewed. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2008).
Mr. Miller objected to Officer Cady's testimony about where the officer parked the
car as irrelevant and as hearsay.

(Tr., p.99, L.21-p.99, L.2.)

The district court

specifically overruled the hearsay objection and apparently overruled the relevance
objection as the testimony was allowed to be presented to the jury.

(Tr., p.99, Ls.3-8.)

There is no reason to offer testimony about where the officers parked their vehicles.
The testimony does not have a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the action more or less probable. The evidence is completely irrelevant
and should not have been presented to the jury. The district court abused its discretion
allowing the evidence to be admitted.
Assuming arguendo that the evidence was relevant, its prejudicial effect
outweighs any limited probative value.

I.R.E. 403 states that "Although relevant,

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice ... " I.R.E. 403.
When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not
outweighed by unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied.

State v.

Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819 (Ct. App. 1993). I.R.E. 403 creates a balancing test. On
one hand, the trial judge must gauge the probative worth of the proffered evidence by
8

focusing upon the degrees of relevance and materiality of the evidence, and the need
for the issue on which it is to be introduced. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107,
111 (1987). At the other end of the equation, the trial judge must consider whether the
evidence results in unfair prejudice. Id.
To some extent, all probative evidence is prejudicial. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho
83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989).

The question is whether that prejudice is unfair; whether it

harms the defendant because it is so inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict
regardless of other facts presented. Id
In the case at hand, the testimonial evidence provided through Officer Cady was
unfairly prejudicial.

The information that the officers were concerned for their safety

lends some credibility to Nadine Steen's testimony that a weapon was used at the
residence. This case was ultimately a credibility determination for the jury to decide if
Nadine Steen was telling the truth. As the judge noted in his sentencing remarks, "I
think the reason you were convicted, having sat through the trial, is the jury believed
Nadine Steen.

They believed you pointed that weapon at her, and they probably

believed you made that threat." (Tr., p.444, Ls.19-22.) Having the jury believe that the
officers approached the house in a certain way because a weapon was used was overly
prejudicial.

Therefore, even if the evidence was relevant, the probative value was

outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
D.

The Admission Of The Evidence Was Not Harmless Error
The admission of the evidence was not harmless error. As explained in Section

l(D), and incorporated herein by reference, because there was a timely objection,
Mr. Miller only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has
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the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. The State cannot show the error was harmless in this case.

Ill.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting The Testimony Of Melissa Miller
About Whether The Family Had A Tradition Of Shooting Guns On New Year's Day
Because The Testimony Was Not Relevant
Mr. Miller objected to Melissa Miller's testimony about whether she has a family
tradition to go out and shoot guns on New Year's Day as irrelevant. (Tr., p.337, Ls.1719.) The district court overruled the objection. (Tr., p.337, Ls.17-19.) The district court
erred. The error was not harmless.
As explained in section II and incorporated herein, evidence must have a
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of whether Mr. Miller committed aggravated assault more or less probable. See I.RE.
401. Whether Ms. Miller has a family tradition to go out and shoot guns on New Year's
Day does not make any fact of whether Mr. Miller committed aggravated assault more
or less probable. The fact is completely irrelevant to the issues in this case and the
district court abused its discretion when it overruled the objection. Because there is no
relevance to the testimony, the probative impact does not outweigh any prejudicial
impact it has. See I.RE. 403.
The admission of the evidence was not harmless error. As explained in Section
l(D), and incorporated herein by reference, because there was a timely objection,
Mr. Miller only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has
the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. The State cannot show the error was harmless in this case.
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IV.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Angie Smith To Offer Hearsay
Testimony About What She Told Melissa Miller In The Kitchen On The Day Of The
Alleged Incident

A

Introduction
Mr. Miller objected to Angie Smith's testimony about what she told Melissa Miller

in the kitchen on the day of the alleged incident as hearsay. (Tr., p.175, L.19.) The
district court overruled the objection finding the offered testimony not to be hearsay
because it was "the" witness's statement.

(Tr., p.175, L.20, p.175, L.23-p.176, L.5.)

The district court erred. The error was not harmless.
Standard Of Review
The standard of review was previously provided in section l(B) and is
incorporated herein. The applicable hearsay rules were articulated in section l(C) and
are incorporated herein.
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Angie Smith To Offer
Hearsay Testimony About What She Told Melissa Miller In The Kitchen On The
Day Of The Alleged Incident
At trial, the court authorized the prosecutor to ask Angie Smith what Melissa

Miller said on the day of the alleged incident, finding the statement to be an exited
utterance.

(Tr., p.174, L.14-p.175, L.14.) When asked by the prosecutor. "What did

Melissa Miller say in the kitchen," Angie Smith responded, "She stated he hit me. And
my response to her was hit you.

He was choking you." (Tr., p.175, Ls.17-18.) The

district court held, "This is what the witness said to Melissa Miller, he was choking you.
That's not hearsay. She is here and she is testifying." (Tr., p.175, Ls.23-25.) When the
defense counsel clarified his objection and stated, "she has testified as to what she said
back then, Judge. It makes it an out-of-court statement. If it is offered for the truth, in
11

my opinion, it makes it hearsay." (Tr., p.176, Ls.1-4.) The court held, "It is not hearsay.
Overruled.

(Tr., p.176, L.5.)

As explained in section (l)(C) and incorporated herein, this is an incorrect
understanding of the hearsay rules. Angie Smith's out of court statements asserted for
the truth of the matter asserted are by definition hearsay. It is irrelevant that she was
there on the stand testifying. See I.R.E. 801(c), 802; Gomez, 126 at 704. The district
court erred in overruling Mr. Miller's hearsay objection.
D.

The Admission Of The Evidence Was Not Harmless Error
Mr. Miller acknowledges that he was acquitted of the charged against Melissa

Miller, however, he still contends that this error was not harmless.

This case was

ultimately a credibility determination for the jury to decide if Nadine Steen was telling the
truth. Utilizing improper hearsay to discredit Melissa Miller reduced her credibility with
the jury. Melissa Miller had testified that Mr. Miller had retrieved a gun and his friend,
Pat Marcia, came up behind him and immediately took it away. (Tr., p.282, L.24-p.283,
L.7.) She believed that Mr. Miller never pointed the gun at anyone, including Nadine

Steen. (Tr., p.283, Ls.20-22.) As the judge noted in his sentencing remarks, "I think the
reason you were convicted, having sat through the trial, is the jury believed Nadine
Steen. They believed you pointed that weapon at her, and they probably believed you
made that threat."

(Tr., p.444, Ls.19-22.)

Thus, the error that occurred was not

harmless. However, because there was a timely objection, Mr. Miller only has the duty
to prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has the burden of
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Perry, 150 Idaho
at 222.
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V.

Under The Doctrine Of Cumulative Error, The Accumulation Of Irregularities During
Trial, Was Sufficient To Warrant A New Trial
Mr. Miller asserts that based on the fact that numerous substantial errors
occurred in his trial, the doctrine of cumulative error applies to his case, and reversal of
his conviction is mandated. The argument and authority in support of the assertion that
error occurred are set forth in sections I, 11, Ill, and IV of the brief and are incorporated
by reference herein.
In State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504 (Ct. App. 2001 ), the Court stated that under
the doctrine of cumulative error, the, "accumulation of irregularities, each of which in
itself might be harmless, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial." Id. at
508 (citations omitted). Mr. Miller asserts that the errors which occurred throughout his
trial were not individually harmless. However, assuming arguendo that this Court finds
that they were, the accumulation of the errors and irregularities that took place negated
his right to a fair trial, and thus, mandate that his convictions be vacated.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Miller respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and remand the matter for a new trial.
DATED this 2ih day of November, 2013.

DIANE M. WALKER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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